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Repugnant to system of justice
Finally, the court stated that the relief the
plaintiff sought was contrary to public policy considerations previously recognized by the Supreme Court of
Illinois. The plaintiff insured his motorcycle for only
$25,000 per person. Thus, if the motorcycle was
involved in an accident in which the plaintiff was at
fault, the injured party would only be able to recover
$25,000. In this case, the plaintiff attempted to recover
more benefits for himself than he elected to make

available to third parties whom he injured. The Supreme Court of Illinois previously stated that this
outcome would be repugnant to the system of justice.
For these reasons, the Supreme Court of
Illinois held that the clause unambiguously prohibited
the plaintiff from seeking uninsured-motorist coverage
from Allstate and that enforcement of this clause did
not violate public policy. Accordingly, the judgment of
the appellate court was reversed, and the judgment of
the circuit court was affirmed.

A muppet will not be confused with lunchmeat
by Tisha Pates Underwood
Muppet fans can take
comfort in knowing that the latest
addition to the muppet family-a
wild boar named Spa'am-is not
overly confusing with the lunchmeat
SPAM. This issue was recently the
center of a legal controversy when
Jim Henson Productions ("Henson")
intended to include the Spa'am
muppet in its latest movie "Treasure
Island" and portray Spa'am on
merchandise. Before releasing the
movie and merchandise, Hormel
Foods Corp. ('Hormel"), the maker
of SPAM, filed suit in the U.S.
District Court of the Southern
District of New York. Hormel
alleged that the proposed use of
Spa'am constituted 1)trademark
infringement and false advertising in
violation of the federal Lanham Act
and 2) unfair competition, deceptive
practices, and trademark dilution in
violation of New York's common
law. In Hormel Foods Corp. v.Jim
Henson Prods.Inc., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d
1812 (1995), the court found that
"Spa'am", the muppet, would not be
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confused by consumers with
"SPAM", the lunchmeat, and held
that "Spa'am" does not dilute the
"SPAM" trademark. Accordingly,
Henson did not violate either the
federal Lanham Act or New York's
trademark laws.

Trademark infringement
and false advertising
claims under the Lanham
Act rejected
Hormel alleged that
Henson's Spa'am constituted
trademark infringement under the
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)
(1988). This section prohibits the
use of a copy or colorable imitation
of another's trademark. In order to
determine whether Spa'am constituted this type of imitation, the court
needed to determine whether
consumers would mistakenly believe
that Hormel approved the use of the
SPAM trademark in the creation and
marketing of Spa'am. To do this, the
court turned to the eight factors

established in PolaroidCorp. v.
PolaradElec. Corp., 287 F.2d 492
(2d Cir. 1961). These factors
include: strength of plaintiff's mark,
similarity of uses, proximity of the
products, likelihood that the prior
owner will bridge the gap (likelihood that one of the manufacturers
will expand into the domain of the
other), actual confusion, defendant's
good or bad faith in using plaintiff's
mark, quality of the junior user's
product, and sophistication of
consumers. Furthermore, since the
Spa'am case involved a parody of
the SPAM lunchmeat, the court held
there were additional First Amendment considerations and the eight
Polaroidfactors should be applied
with proper weight given to those
considerations.
The court held that all of
the Polaroidfactors were either
inapplicable or favored Henson.
Hormel failed to show likelihood of
consumer confusion and, thus, the
existence of trademark infringement.
The court noted, "[N]o one likes to
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be the butt of a joke, not even a
trademark. But the requirement of
trademark law is that a likely
confusion of source, sponsorship or
affiliation must be proven, which is
not the same things as a 'right' not
to be made fun of." In short, the
court held that Hormel could not use
federal trademark laws to "enjoin
what is obviously a joke at its
expense."
Hormel also alleged that
Spa'am constituted false advertising
under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §
1125(a) (1988). This section bars
any false or misleading representation of fact that misrepresents the
nature, characteristics, qualities or
geographic origin of another's
goods. Hormel claimed that Spa'am
"falsely personifies SPAM as a nasty
pagan brute" and, thus, a false
representation of SPAM is made.
The court rejected the argument and
held that "the depiction of the
Spa'am character is not a statement
of fact, but a spoof-the very
antithesis of a fact." Consequently,
the court held that Homel faileded to
make out a misrepresentation of
fact, and Hormel's false advertising
claim was denied.

New York state law claims

rejected
In addition to its federal
claims, Hormel alleged that
Henson's use of Spa'am amounted
to unfair competition and deceptive
practices under New York state law.
The court held that these claims
were substantially similar to the
claims Hormel advanced under the
Lanham Act. Therefore, the same
analysis applied, and the claims
were rejected.

1996

Hormel also claimed that
Spa'am violated New York's antidilution statute, N.Y. Gen Bus. Law
§ 368-d. This section is similar to
the trademark infringement section
of the Lanham Act except that
consumer confusion is not an
element of this offense. Violations of
§ 368-d are divided into three
categories: blurring, tarnishment,
and other.
"Blurring" is the "whittling
away of an established trademark's
selling power and value through its
unauthorized use by others in
dissimilar products." Mead Data
Cent., Inc. v. Toyota, 875 F.2d 1026
(2d Cir. 1961). In no decision was
this statute held applicable to a
parody as a blurring violation. This
absence is understandable, because
"the use of famous marks in
parodies causes no loss of distinctiveness, since the success of the use
depends upon the continued association of the mark with the plaintiff."
1982 Wis. L. REV. 158. In this case,
the court found that the Spa'am
parody was unlikely to blur
Hormel's trademark since the joke
relied on (and thus reinforced) the
distinctiveness of the SPAM mark.
"Tarnishment" arises when
"the plaintiff's trademark is linked
to products of shoddy quality or is
portrayed in an unwholesome or
unsavory context." Hormel contended that Spa'am would tarnish its
trademark in three different ways.
First, it argued that Spa'am's
unhygenic appearance would tarnish
SPAM. The court found no evidence
of this alleged unhygienic appearance in the motion picture. Second,
Hormel claimed that SPAM would
be tarnished by the association with
Spa'am as a result of Spa'am's

allegedly threatening and cowardly
behavior. The court held that
negative associations with Spa'am
were unlikely given its childlike
qualities and ultimately positive
behavior. Finally, Hormel argued
that Spa'am's behavior portrayed
SPAM in an "unsavory context."
The court held this allegation was
inaccurate based on the wider
context of Spa'am-the character
appeared in a high-quality, goodhumored, family-oriented movie.
"Other" is a category
reserved for types of dilution that
qualify neither as "blurring" nor
"tarnishment." The court has
explicitly exempted satirists who are
selling no product, but only want to
parody a trademark in order to
entertain. Accordingly, the use of
Spa'am in the movie is exempted
from the reaches of the "other"
category. However, Hormel argued
that the merchandising of Spa'am's
likeness on tee-shirts and other items
is not exempted. The court held that
Henson altered Hormel's trademark
for entertainment purposes, and the
fact that the altered trademark may
be used on merchandise is not
problematic enough to place it
within the "other" category. Additionally, the court stated that this
conclusion was further supported by
the fact that Henson did not have
"predatory intent of either appropriating for itself the goodwill associated with Hormel's name or trademark." This lack of "predatory
intent", although not required by the
statute, was found to be relevant in
the court's decision to deny the
"other" type of dilution claim.
Therefore, the court held that no
blurring, tamishment, or other types
of dilution of Hormel's trademark
existed under New York law.
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